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Abstract: The Green Economy (GE) paradigm aims to reconcile environmental and socio-economic 9 
objectives. Policies to deploy renewable energy (RE) are widely perceived as a way to tap the 10 
potential synergies of these objectives. It is, however, still largely unclear whether the potential of 11 
simultaneously achieving both environmental and socio-economic objectives can be fully realized, 12 
and whether and how multiple objectives influence policy design, implementation, and evaluation. 13 
We aim to contribute to this aspect of GE research by looking at selected country experiences of 14 
renewable energy deployment with respect to the socio-economic goals of job creation or energy 15 
access. Across the cases examined, we find the following implications of relevance for the GE 16 
framework: First, we confirm the important role of governmental action for GE, with the specific 17 
need to state objectives clearly and build monitoring capacity. Second, consistent with the “strong” 18 
green growth variant of GE, some of the cases suggest that while renewable deployment may indeed 19 
lead to short-term socio-economic benefits, these benefits may not last. Third, we underline the 20 
urgent need for new methodologies to analyze and better understand multiple-objective policies, 21 
which are at the heart of the GE paradigm.  22 
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1. Introduction 1 
One of the main premises of the “Green Economy” (GE) concept is that low-carbon energy 2 
technologies have considerable potential to achieve socio-economic objectives alongside 3 
environmental ones. In essence, the GE paradigm promises a new holistic model of societal well-4 
being. This is evident from UNEP’s definition of the concept: A green economy “results in improved 5 
human well-being and social equity, while significantly reducing environmental risks and ecological 6 
scarcities” (UNEP 2011). However, GE is a relatively vague concept that builds on a number of implicit 7 
assumptions, which have been scrutinized in scientific literature. In this regard, Bowen & Hepburn 8 
(2014), largely based on Jacobs (2013), identify two forms of green growth (GG), which can be seen 9 
as more specific versions of a GE. “Standard” green growth concepts postulate that green (i.e. 10 
environmental) policies will reduce economic growth in the short run, but increase it in the long run. 11 
In contrast, “strong” green growth asserts that green policies can also increase economic growth in 12 
the short run. Bowen & Hepburn (2014) further claim that from a theoretical point of view, strong 13 
green growth may only hold under one of the following conditions: (a) if, during an economic 14 
downturn, green policies provide an important stimulus for economic recovery (“green 15 
Keynesianism”); (b) if green policies explicitly address existing market failures, for example an 16 
inadequate provision of infrastructure; or (c) if green policies incentivize entrepreneurs to establish 17 
competitive advantage in green technologies and services through associated innovation. 18 
Apart from its dependence on specific assumptions, the concept of GG is also questioned on 19 
fundamental grounds. First, critics of the so called “growth imperative” like Daly (2013) question 20 
whether growth – green or otherwise – can actually increase wealth, or at least increase it faster 21 
than illth. Jakob & Edenhofer (2014) question whether growth in general, as well as de-growth as an 22 
alternative, are useful approaches at all. They reason that growth as an approach fails to explicitly 23 
identify the objectives that should ultimately be achieved via economic growth. In other words, they 24 
see growth as a means, rather than as an end, to achieve societal welfare. One implication of this 25 
stance for the GG and GE concepts is the necessity to specify policy objectives, so as to evaluate the 26 
performance of green policies in achieving them. The most important reference here is certainly the 27 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), not least because it has been explicitly argued that a GE is 28 
essential for sustainable economic development (Barbier & Markandya 2013). We therefore depart 29 
from a focus on growth as a metric to assess the relevance of the GE concept in policy-making and 30 
look at the interlinkages between renewable energy policies and jobs as well as energy access. 31 
The above GE literature raises several important questions that motivate this paper and are 32 
addressed in four exploratory case studies. First, to what extent do green policies explicitly target 33 
socio-economic objectives or are even driven by these objectives? For instance, empirical evidence 34 
suggests that RE deployments, particularly in developing countries, are often implemented as socio-35 
economic policies; see for example Recalde (2015) on Latin America and Steinbacher (2015) on 36 
Morocco. This is important because formulated or intended objectives obviously determine how 37 
policies are designed and evaluated, and are also likely to affect how they perform in achieving 38 
multiple objectives. In fact, this issue of multi-objective policies is as yet largely unexplored in the 39 
literature. A second relevant aspect with a view to the “strong” green growth concept outlined above 40 
is to explore whether green policies are able to bring about socio-economic benefits in the short to 41 
mid term – and not only in the long term. Against this background, we aim to look at several 42 
countries’ experiences along these two lines of inquiry – the role of multiple objectives in policy 43 
design and stated short-term benefits in terms of outcomes – and reflect upon their implications for 44 
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GE and GE research. We aim to add value to the GE debate by covering heterogeneous cases – South 1 
Africa, Germany, Morocco, and Kenya - and derive lessons learned from these countries. Our aim is 2 
exploratory in nature and we do not strive to judge or evaluate policy effects in particular cases. 3 
Specifically, we focus on policies for the deployment of renewable energy and two socio-economic 4 
objectives identified by SDG 7 and 8, namely the provision of energy access and job creation. 5 
According to UNEP (2011), low-carbon technologies – particularly renewable energies in the 6 
electricity sector (RE) – bear considerable potential for making progress towards these and other 7 
objectives, such as public health and energy security. The IEA (2013) emphasizes the role of RE in 8 
achieving universal access to modern energy sources by 2030, while IRENA (2016) underlines their 9 
potential for job creation. The socio-economic dimension of RE is also acknowledged in climate 10 
change science and global policy debates. In particular, the recent IPCC AR5 (2014) finds that 11 
measures to deploy RE are often associated with other societal goals – and a positive interaction is 12 
believed to create the possibility of “co-benefits.” 13 
Existing research on analyzing the potential of job creation or energy access through RE policies are 14 
largely model-based ex-ante assessments. A number of existing studies cover the potential of job 15 
creation through clean energy policies, both in developing and in developed countries; see for 16 
example Dai et al. (2016), Bowen & Kuralbayeva (2015) and the studies cited in IPCC (2012), OECD 17 
(2010), and GIZ (2015). Most of these studies focus on gross employment and suggest that an 18 
expansion of RE has positive effects. A smaller number of studies, using more sophisticated models, 19 
analyze net employment impacts, and the results of these also suggest that effects are positive. A 20 
notable exception, contrasting policy targets with outcomes, is Rathmann et al. (2012), who look at 21 
the Brazilian biodiesel program and find that the “promised land” has not been reached. From a 22 
theoretical point of view, Fankhauser et al. (2008) point out that gross employment can indeed be 23 
positive for two reasons: First, sectors immediately related to RE production are likely to expand. 24 
Second, these sectors are, in general, more labor intensive than traditional industries. The authors, 25 
however, also underline that direct employment gains are likely to diminish when technologies 26 
become mature. Long-term employment can, however, be sustained when RE expansion is successful 27 
as a green industrial policy, i.e. in building up an industry that is globally competitive (e.g. Rodrik 28 
2014).  29 
Concerning energy access, several studies point to the large potential of decentralized RE for 30 
electrification, especially in rural areas (IPCC 2012, REN21 2014). However, initiatives for distributed 31 
renewable energy face a distinctive set of technical, policy, financial, institutional, and regulatory 32 
challenges (Palit 2013; WRI 2015). Several studies have identified the main barriers to the 33 
deployment and uptake of small-scale renewables; see for example Chaurey & Kandpal (2010), 34 
Sovacool et al. (2011), IOB (2014) and Urpelainen (2016) specifically for solar home systems (SHS). 35 
For these reasons it is widely assumed that grid connection is generally preferred as an option where 36 
it is feasible (van der Vleuten et al. 2007). Intermittency and capacity constraints of RE systems can 37 
also limit the extent to which they can satisfy commercial and productive needs, or increasing 38 
demands associated with growing appliance use. Even in areas where renewables-based options are 39 
competitive, they may still be unaffordable for poor rural households. Innovative business models or 40 
financing may be needed to make these affordable. While off-grid renewables are becoming 41 
increasingly competitive with grid-based systems, particularly in remote rural regions, the fraction of 42 
population whose demand will be met through such systems remains open to debate (Deichmann et 43 
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al. 2011; Zeyringer et al. 2015), and evidence on impacts is still insufficient (Jürisoo et al. 2014; 1 
Azimoh et al. 2015; Rao et al. 2016). 2 
In summary, there are gaps in the literature regarding the realization of the seemingly high potential 3 
and respective expectations of RE’s contribution to socio-economic objectives. Studies in this 4 
direction are so far relatively sparse in the literature; this is particularly the case for large-scale RE 5 
deployment policies that are still a relatively new development. 6 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the methodology used. 7 
Section 3 covers the case studies on RE policies and job creation in Germany and South Africa, while 8 
section 4 covers the Moroccan and Kenyan case studies on the deployment of renewables for energy 9 
access. Section 5 discusses the key findings from the case studies for the GE paradigm and Section 6 10 
concludes. 11 
2. Methodology 12 
Given the lack of empirical studies that specifically look at the links between renewable energy 13 
policies and socio-economic objectives, our aim in this paper is to cover a diverse range of cases in an 14 
exploratory manner and thereby help prepare the ground for more in-depth studies. In other words, 15 
our overarching aim is to grasp and present country experiences with the design and implementation 16 
of policies at the intersection of renewable energy promotion and socio-economic objectives. By 17 
doing so, we also strive to identify common patterns across these diverse cases and to link them back 18 
to the theoretical green economy debate. Importantly, we do not conduct original evaluation of any 19 
specific policy, which would be beyond the scope of this paper. 20 
Methodologically, we approach the question of interlinkages between RE policies and socio-21 
economic objectives by adopting a “multiple-case” design (Yin 2009: 48). In this design, several 22 
processes and events are taken into account within each case study. Cases are looked at separately 23 
in a first step and are then compared in a second step. Case studies are described by Gerring (2004) 24 
as “an intensive study of a single unit with an aim to generalize across a larger set of units.” Of 25 
course, the confines of this paper and our decision to address four diverse cases limit the depth to 26 
which each case can be studied, as well as generalization of respective findings. Within each case 27 
study, we mainly rely on a review of secondary sources (e.g. policy documents, statements, 28 
evaluations, analysis from in-country experts regarding the programs). In South Africa, primary data 29 
from sixty interviews carried out with stakeholders and decision-makers in late 2014 was also used 30 
(Steinbacher forthcoming). Not relying on original research and making use mostly of gray literature 31 
of course limits the validity of results somewhat. Accordingly, we only claim indicative evidence in 32 
each case, which requires further peer-reviewed scientific research to be confirmed and better 33 
understood. 34 
Case selection in this paper is based on a set of criteria that make Germany, South Africa, Morocco, 35 
and Kenya important cases for further hypothesis generation and theory building in the GE literature 36 
(on case studies and inference see George & Bennett 2005 and Levy 2008). First, initial case-37 
knowledge suggests multiple policy objectives are likely to have played a role in policy formulation in 38 
the four cases. Furthermore, the selected cases are salient – and sometimes even emblematic – and 39 
are often referred to as examples; see for example Le Cordeur (2015) on South Africa and Morgan & 40 
Weischer (2013) on Germany. A second point considered in selecting the cases was to ensure that 41 
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the policies or programs examined were large enough in scope and ambition to demonstrate 1 
discernible effects, which also ensures that data on policies is available. That said, the latter is an 2 
issue for further research and mentioned again in section 5 of this paper. 3 
The in-case analysis is structured along the lines of a strongly simplified model of the policy process, 4 
i.e. the policy cycle (Dunn 2012). Despite numerous critiques (Fischer et al. 2007: 55), the policy cycle 5 
is a useful tool/framework, enabling us to discuss the role of multiple objectives in the agenda-6 
setting, policy formulation, and implementation phases. The policy process implies the following four 7 
questions guiding the structure of our exploratory, short case studies: (1) Are multiple objectives 8 
pursued with the adoption of the policy? (2) Exactly how are these objectives reflected in policy 9 
design? (3) What results are visible and how are these appraised? (4) Are tradeoffs or synergies 10 
visible and do they appear to influence policy redesign or the stability of policies, or possibly even 11 
termination? 12 
Figure 1 provides an overview of the structure of our case studies: 13 
 14 
Figure 1: Case studies and focus within cases 15 
3. RE deployment and job creation 16 
3.1. South Africa: Job creation as a core driver of RE deployment 17 
Job creation as a key driver for the design of RE policy 18 
South Africa’s electricity system relies on coal for well over 90% of its generation, leading to pressure 19 
to diversify in the direction of cleaner sources of energy (Alton et al. 2014). The main policy for 20 
deploying RE in South Africa is the Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer Procurement 21 
Program (REIPPPP) launched in 2011 to replace previous feed-in tariffs that were never effectively 22 
implemented (Pegels 2011). Interviewees from the public and private sector with an energy 23 
background in South Africa were asked to rank the objectives of the RE policy (for methods, see also 24 
Joas et al. in press, Steinbacher 2015). The main underlying drivers identified for the REIPPPP were 25 
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energy security as well as job creation and industrial policy. Improving security of supply – in light of 1 
the growing incapacity of South Africa’s state-owned utility ESKOM to finance and manage the 2 
addition of much-needed electricity capacity – was seen as a top driver for the program (average 3 
rank of 2.4 out of 15 objectives proposed). Only job creation was seen as an even more important 4 
policy objective (average rank of 2.2), and it was often mentioned together with the objective of 5 
industrial policy (2.5). The very strong interlinkages between socio-economic objectives and the 6 
REIPPPP were recently underlined by South African Energy Minister Tina Joemat-Pettersson, who 7 
stated that the program is designed to “contribute to economic growth and job creation, in addition 8 
to the contribution it makes to security of electricity supply” (Joemat-Pettersson 2015).  9 
The REIPPPP is not the only reflection of socio-economic objectives in clean energy and climate policy 10 
debates in South Africa. The government’s New Growth Path sets a goal of “300,000 additional direct 11 
jobs by 2020 to green the economy,” with “renewable energy construction and manufactur[ing] of 12 
inputs” as main contributors (Department of Economic Development 2010). Estimates of the number 13 
of jobs created through the deployment of renewable energy in South Africa range from roughly 14 
36,000 direct additional jobs to well over 400,000. The maximum figure depends on how many 15 
indirect jobs are taken into account (Department of Energy 2015b: 135). The objective of creating 16 
local jobs should be viewed in the context of South Africa’s 52.6% youth unemployment rate in 2014 17 
(increased from 50.1% in 2011) and a total unemployment rate of about one quarter of the 18 
population (World Bank 2016).  19 
The South African Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer Procurement Program 20 
(REIPPPP) 21 
The REIPPPP is a tender-based renewable energy procurement program, where power purchasing 22 
agreements (PPAs) for defined volumes of capacity for each technology are tendered in a two-stage 23 
process in yearly rounds (Eberhard et al. 2014). The program is notable for the important place it 24 
grants to socio-economic objectives, which are directly reflected in policy design. A particular feature 25 
of the evaluation of bids in the REIPPPP is that only 70% of points are allocated based on price, while 26 
30% is based on other criteria targeted at achieving socio-economic policy objectives in line with 27 
development priorities and the requirements of the Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 28 
(Eberhard et al. 2014, 13).  One quarter of the 30 “economic development” points that bidders can 29 
earn relates to direct job creation requirements (Stands 2015, 55). Other socio-economic objectives 30 
include local content requirements, black ownership, and local economic development, which are 31 
defined in specific ways in the context of the REIPPPP (WWF South Africa: 16). The diversity and 32 
scope of economic development criteria and the direct involvement of local communities set this 33 
program apart (WWF South Africa 2015). 34 
Evaluations of the achievement of the job creation target  35 
The South African Department of Energy estimates that 25,526 direct jobs (one job being defined as 36 
one person-year) were created by the 1,417 MW of successful projects in bidding round three (7,813 37 
jobs were available during the construction phase). This more than doubled the number of jobs 38 
created by projects from round two (Department of Energy 2015b: 135). For the fourth REIPPPP 39 
bidding round, which closed in 2015, successful projects are expected to create 27,365 person-years 40 
of direct employment over a 20 year period, of which 7,071 will be available during construction; 41 
95.9% of jobs are committed to be held by South African citizens (Department of Energy 2015b). 42 
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Given the poor quality of electricity supply in South Africa and frequent blackouts that constrain 1 
economic development, the indirect effects of the REIPPPP on job creation are also expected to be 2 
positive. By adding much-needed electricity capacity within a short time-frame,  solar and wind 3 
projects are expected to generate net financial benefits of 4bn ZAR in the first half of 2015 (Calitz et 4 
al. 2015).  5 
In addition to direct job creation by REIPPPP projects, large and increasing proportions of local 6 
content in successful projects are likely to have positive effects on job creation in South Africa. Local 7 
content in PV projects in round four exceeded 64% (up from 38.4% in round 1), and the equivalent of 8 
wind is 44.6%, up from 27.4% in round one (Department of Energy 2015a). The associated decrease 9 
in prices of the tenders indicates that – in the South African case – local content requirements and 10 
increasing economic efficiency can go together. The special features of the South African market 11 
(size, availability of finance, excellent resources) need to be borne in mind for the transferability of 12 
lessons to other developing countries. The question has been raised, however, as to whether the 13 
current design of REIPPPP leverages the full potential of economic development throughout the 14 
program. As pointed out by Eberhard et al. (2014: 28), the focus on value-based assessments of local 15 
content could limit the potential for job creation given that higher-value components tend to be less 16 
labor-intensive. 17 
Beyond the official government numbers, recent studies (Eberhard et al. 2014, WWF South Africa 18 
2015, Tait et al. 2013, Stands 2015) assess the developmental achievements of the REIPPPP. Findings 19 
from Stands’ comprehensive survey on job creation in the REIPPPP (Stands 2015: 84)  – the first of its 20 
kind in the South African context –  indicate that the “program has exceeded all thresholds and 21 
targets set out in the bid document scorecard. Results communicated by the Department of Energy 22 
might thus underrepresent actual job creation, “leaving room for speculation and rumors about this 23 
new industry to emerge” (WWF South Africa 2015: 20). The uncertainty surrounding official job 24 
creation figures in South Africa underlines the tremendous need for further independent 25 
assessments of job creation through the REIPPPP, with continuous evaluation and monitoring.  26 
Furthermore, project companies are found to be “taking the [economic development] requirements 27 
seriously” (WWF South Africa 2015: 2; Stands 2015: 90), and to be genuinely interested in delivering 28 
the developmental aspect of their projects, given the political priority attached to job creation and 29 
local development (Stands 2015: 84).   30 
Despite the generally positive assessment of the REIPPPP, including on dimensions other than job 31 
creation, a lack of transparent communication and consistent monitoring has led to uncertainty 32 
surrounding the achievements of the REIPPPP in the past. There has been anecdotal evidence 33 
concerning foreign renewable energy companies flying in their workforce, even for truck driver jobs. 34 
With the success of foreign utilities in bidding round three (with more than half of PV capacity won 35 
by Italian utility company Enel), this has strengthened the voice of renewable energy skeptics. 36 
Nuclear and coal activists readily point out the jobs potential in their respective industries.  37 
“Improving lives through wind energy” reflects the industry’s concern of being seen as contributing 38 
to socio-economic development through its projects. Industry stakeholders interviewed stressed that 39 
any sign of fabricated job creation expectations would put into question the future of the REIPPPP. 40 
Underlining that any policy in South Africa had to be a jobs policy above all, project developers 41 
worried about unrealistic expectations of substantial job creation and local content. At the same time 42 
auction results were expected to decrease round after round and RE projects to come online within 43 
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short timelines. Concerns over the REIPPPP’s track record seem to have waned and recent ministerial 1 
announcements point to an extension of the REIPPPP (Joemat-Pettersson 2015). The South African 2 
case nevertheless illustrates the importance of managing job creation expectations and transparent 3 
communication of achievements, both in terms of the quantity and quality of jobs (WWF South Africa 4 
2015, Stands 2015). The limited size of the overall program and a complete lack of visibility beyond 5 
2020 create highly challenging conditions for RE companies expected to contribute to economic 6 
development. A stronger focus on transparency, capacity development (including among project 7 
developers), and communication between stakeholders involved appears necessary to safeguard 8 
acceptance and future expansion of a renewable energy program that is expected to excel in several 9 
dimensions. Even more importantly, the lack of independent and thorough monitoring of the 10 
REIPPPP, particularly concerning the very sensitive political issue of job creation, makes an evaluation 11 
of the promise of GE challenging.  12 
3.2. Germany: Two stories of creating competitive advantages in RE 13 
industries 14 
The role of jobs for renewable energy promotion 15 
The promotion of renewable energy (RE) in Germany was primarily driven by environmental 16 
concerns, but prospective job creation has been a welcome side effect and important political 17 
motivation. The feed-in tariff scheme (Renewable Energy Act, EEG) was set up in 2000 as the main 18 
policy for deploying RE. The main intention of it was to develop different technologies for 19 
environmental reasons1, but there was also the promise of creating new jobs. A particular concern 20 
was that the 1998 electricity market liberalization would lead to a long-term decline of RE 21 
deployment in this sector. Moreover, it was feared that decreasing energy prices would put jobs in 22 
the newly created wind industry at risk (Lauber & Mez 2004; Jacobsson & Lauber 2006). 23 
Employment, however, has never been an official objective in the underlying EEG Act. This was 24 
recently reemphasized by the German Government (Bundesregierung 2015), which stated that it is 25 
only a welcome side effect. 26 
Job creation as an argument and reason for RE deployment has continued to be of political 27 
relevance, even though the evidence for it is primarily implicit. The ministries in control of RE 28 
deployment have continuously commissioned studies to analyze the impact on job creation, 29 
suggesting that they view it as a politically relevant indicator. Moreover, the number of jobs created 30 
was also highlighted in the recent Energiewende monitoring report (BMWi 2015b). Finally, a survey 31 
of policy experts on the goals of the Energiewende (Joas et al. in press) suggests that jobs, together 32 
with acquiring technology and market leadership in RE technologies, still play a crucial role in the 33 
political debate. This is also because they are of use in gaining political support for RE promotion 34 
from the employed and their associations.  35 
Policy design & complementary measures 36 
The fact that job creation is not an official objective is also reflected in the design of the policies. In 37 
particular, unlike the case of South Africa and many other countries (see Kuntze & Moerenhout 2013) 38 
the EEG does not contain any explicit local content provisions that require a certain proportion of the 39 
installed plant to be produced domestically. The only action that had been taken in this regard were 40 
                                                          
1 Since then other measures have been introduced, but the EEG definitely remained the most important one. 
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trade sanctions imposed at the EU level in 2013 to keep at bay the “dumped and subsidized imports 1 
of solar panels from China” (EC 2015) which were backed by the German government. 2 
There have, however, been a number of complementary measures of economic promotion – explicit 3 
and implicit – from both the federal and state governments to foster job creation and industry 4 
development through the deployment of renewables. These measures comprise financial tax 5 
incentives, favorable custom duties, export credit assistance, quality certification, and different 6 
forms of loans; see Lewis & Wiser (2007) and Kuntze & Moerenhout (2013). Data on such measures 7 
is, however, sparse and unsystematic except for the official funds provided for energy R&D by the 8 
federal and state governments (see BMWi 2015a). The total financial volume of all measures 9 
together is unclear, but it is very likely dwarfed by the 16 billion EUR in EEG expenditures in the same 10 
year (BDEW 2015).    11 
Impacts of RE expansion on jobs 12 
Figure 2, based on Lehr et al. (2015), shows gross employment through the deployment of RE for 13 
selected years in the period from 2004 through 2013. Jobs include both direct and indirect jobs: the 14 
former are jobs in companies that provide goods and services directly related to RE, for example 15 
wind turbine manufacturing, while the latter are jobs lower down the supply chain, for example 16 
production of silicon wafers (also see GIZ 2015). Estimates of net employment, i.e. the overall 17 
balance of jobs created and lost, can, however, be either positive or negative: according to Lutz et al. 18 
(2014) net job creation turned negative in the power sector, which uses by far the most RE , but this 19 
is positive in other studies (e.g. Blazejczak et al. 2013). From a societal perspective, net effects are 20 
the more relevant indicator, but they are methodologically very difficult to estimate and thus figures 21 
are relatively uncertain. Moreover, gross job effects are useful in analyzing the long-term structural 22 
effects of job creation (see Section 1). This is why we concentrate on them in the following 23 
paragraphs, focusing on the most insightful cases of wind and solar PV.  24 
 25 
Figure 2: Estimated gross employment effects through RE in Germany (based on Lehr et al. 2015) 26 
With regard to wind energy, the majority of jobs are related to investment, including exports (86%). 27 
More specifically, (onshore) wind turbine manufacturing is characterized by a high proportion of 28 
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exports (61%) and, at the same time, a very low proportion of imports (1%); two German companies 1 
(Siemens and enercon) have been in the global top ten for years (see Pegels & Lütkenhorst 2014). 2 
Wind energy thus more or less resembles the prototypical case of a globally competitive industry as 3 
aspired to by (green) industrial policies.  4 
The emblematic example of the German solar industry appears to be a more salient case, especially 5 
since it is alleged worldwide as providing evidence of failure to build up an industry. In fact, the 6 
development of employment in solar cell and module production leaves no doubt about the rise and 7 
fall of this industry. According to federal labor market statistics (see Figure 3) jobs in the field of 8 
module and cell production rose from around 2,000 at the beginning of 2009 to more than 12,000 in 9 
late 2011, only to plunge back down to around 2,000 in the middle of 2014. Two related explanations 10 
are often given for this (see for example BMWi 2012; Lehr et al. 2015): (a) The surge of PV 11 
deployment made companies too optimistic regarding the future demand and considerable 12 
production overcapacities were built. Many of these capacities had to be shut down when demand 13 
for German modules and cells proved lower than expected. (b) Many new players, particularly in 14 
China, entered the world market in the late 2000s and increased competition led to an industry 15 
shake-out, which particularly affected German companies due to their cost disadvantages. This is 16 
underlined by looking at the proportion of German products installed in the German market, which 17 
fell from around 60% in 2008 to 15% in 2011. The proportion of Chinese producers, however, rose 18 
from 21% in 2008 to 60% in 2011 (BMWi 2012).  19 
 20 
Figure 3: Jobs in solar module and cell production (Source: Destatis) 21 
This development does not hold true for all solar industries though, as other industries higher up the 22 
value chain have fared considerably better. According to data provided by VDMA (2015) PV 23 
equipment producers as a whole provided more than 50% of the world market share in 2015 and are 24 
thus still well positioned; for a list of companies and number of employees see GTAI (2013). This 25 
confirms earlier assessments, for example by Claudy et al. (2010), according to which the prospects 26 
are particularly good in sectors where German companies are already established and have strong 27 
comparative advantages, such as manufacturing (also see wind industry above). Hence, the 28 
widespread notion that job creation has completely failed in the solar industries must be put into 29 





Lessons and feedback of achieved effects on policy stability & design 1 
In summary, Germany’s record in creating and sustaining new industries and jobs through RE 2 
deployment is so far mixed. Developments in the solar cell and module production have shown that 3 
the new industries were eroded by world market competition. The more successful cases of wind 4 
energy – and in terms of absolute jobs to a lesser extent also bioenergy and other parts of the solar 5 
industry value chain – suggests that existing comparative advantages may be a decisive factor. Of 6 
course, the question of how such comparative advantages can be sustained in the long term also 7 
remains open. In particular the negative outcome in the solar industry has so far had no visible 8 
impact on RE policy design and deployment targets. The reason is presumed to be that Germany’s 9 
Energiewende was never primarily a job policy and environmental concerns prevailed. 10 
4. Energy access polices and RE technologies 11 
4.1. Kenya: Slow grid extension as a driver for market-based off-grid PV  12 
Genesis and evolution of rural electrification plans and policies 13 
In 1974, the first Rural Electrification Programme (REP) was launched to increase access to electricity 14 
in rural areas in Kenya. Early progress was slow, as estimates from a 1993 survey suggest that 15 
household electricity access among rural households was about 3% (see Table 1) (NCPD et al. 1994). 16 
In 1997, the first Rural Electrification Masterplan was developed to plan, prioritize, and accelerate 17 
rural electrification in Kenya. However, progress continued at a very slow pace. Estimates from a 18 
2003 national survey suggest that rural household access to electricity had crept up to only 4.6% (CBS 19 
et al. 2004). Other national sources suggest that rural electrification stood at about 2% at the turn of 20 
the millennium (Karekezi & Kithyoma 2002). The Rural Electrification Masterplan was updated in 21 
2009 and envisaged rapid expansion of on-grid capacity. However, household electrification rates in 22 
rural areas remain very low; the most recent estimates suggest that it was less than 13% in 2013 23 
(KNBS 2014).  24 
As part of Kenya’s vision 2030, the Rural Electrification Authority (REA), which is mandated to 25 
accelerate the pace of rural electrification, has now set a target of increasing connectivity to 100% by 26 
2030 with an interim goal of over 50% by 2022 (Government of Kenya 2012). This means the pace of 27 
providing new connections each year needs to increase significantly. With on-grid connection costs 28 
remaining out of reach for most poor rural customers, how this will be achieved remains unclear.  29 
Evolution and drivers of residential solar home systems (SHS) in rural electrification plans and 30 
policies 31 
Initial interest in renewables emerged after the oil crises of the 1970s and was motivated by a desire 32 
to reduce the cost of national oil imports and increase national energy sovereignty and resilience 33 
(Karekezi & Kithyoma 2002). However, while these incentives still underlie the government’s new 34 
plans to rapidly expand on-grid (primarily geothermal-based) renewable electric capacity, the off-grid 35 
solar PV sector is largely excluded from recent policies and plans. 36 
The development of the solar PV sector in rural Kenya was initiated in 1984 by two ex-U.S. Peace 37 
Corps volunteers. They were instrumental in attracting interest from donors and the Kenyan 38 
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government by organizing a number of demonstration projects showcasing PV systems in Kenya, 1 
(Byrne 2009). At the time, the government strategy for the off-grid SHS sector was one of no policy, 2 
i.e. to leave it largely unregulated. In 1986, indirect policy measures in the form of exemption from 3 
value-added tax (VAT) and duties on imported PV products and components were implemented. 4 
Since then, however, taxes and duties have been applied and removed many times and at different 5 
rates, and on different parts of PV systems (Byrne et al. 2014). More recently, since 2012, regulations 6 
for the PV sector have also come into force in the form of licensing and technical standards. On the 7 
whole, while government documents have continued to refer to solar energy, there have been few 8 
incentives and no specific targets or legislations designed to increase its uptake. 9 
Climate change or environmental considerations appear to have neither explicitly nor implicitly 10 
motivated the SHS market development in Kenya. According to several scholars, solar PV market 11 
growth in rural areas was tied to the slow pace of grid extension and lack of confidence in the 12 
government’s ability to honor its rural electrification targets (Bawakyillenuo 2012; Jacobson 2007; 13 
Acker & Kammen 1996). The dramatic drop in PV prices together with increasing demand for 14 
electricity from better-off rural plantation workers and a growing rural middle class have also 15 
contributed. The availability of batteries manufactured locally has also been credited as having a 16 
positive impact.  17 
While much of the literature on SHS in Kenya points to the private market-driven nature of the 18 
sector, recent analysis challenges this view and asserts that indirect public policy support and donor 19 
support were vital to building markets, absorbing risks, and developing actor networks that were key 20 
to the growth of the sector in Kenya (Byrne et al. 2014; Newell et al. 2014; Bawakyillenuo 2012). 21 
Donor support in the form of the photovoltaic market transformation initiative (PVMTI) implemented 22 
by the World Bank between 1998 and 2008, with a total budget of US$ 5 million, was particularly 23 
important for the development of the sector. The funds were used to provide technical assistance, 24 
particularly in the areas of training and quality assurance (Hansen et al. 2014). In addition, bilateral 25 
donors such as GIZ also contributed by providing direct financial resources and by creating the 26 
supporting industry and supply-side conditions to promote market development (Bawakyillenuo 27 
2012). 28 
Targets and achievements: SHS and rural household electrification 29 
Data on progress with rural electrification and SHS installations in Kenya over the last couple of 30 
decades is provided in Table 1 below. The REA has set specific targets for rural electrification in its 31 
strategic plan. The plan includes three phases: Phase I from 2008-2012, with targets for connecting 32 
all public facilities and one million rural customers and increase connectivity to 22%; Phase II from 33 
2013-2022 aiming to increase connectivity to 65%; and Phase III for 2022-2030 aiming to increase 34 
connectivity to 100%. As can be seen from the table, the targets for rural customer connectivity have 35 
not been achieved for Phase I.  36 
Monitoring and evaluation activities providing insights on experiences with PV for household uses or 37 
reliability and quality of grid-connected power supply in Kenya remain extremely limited. However, 38 
some studies indicate that between a fifth and a quarter of installed SHS in Kenya in the past were 39 
not functional or only partially functioning (Acker & Kammen 1996). Erratic equipment quality and 40 
installation and maintenance standards have been cited as some of the reasons for this. The 41 
popularity of the new fee-for-service and pay-as-you-go business models in the SHS market shift the 42 
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responsibility for maintenance and quality assurance to the service providers, which might be of 1 
benefit to customers. However, the systems have not been in place long enough or deployed at a 2 
scale sufficient to allow a more systematic evaluation of their merits and impacts.  3 










1993 n.a. 20,000 3.4 
1998 48,949 66,500 4.3 
2003 87,175 150,000 4.6 
2008 205,287 260,000 8.1. 
2013 528,552 350,000 12.6 
Sources: 1) Kenya Power (various); 2) Estimated from Ondraczek 2013; 3) NCPD et al. 1994, CBS et al. 2004, KNBS 2014;  5 
Note * includes rural, urban and institutional. 6 
Changes to plans and policies and future outlook 7 
Kenya’s new energy policy does not define any goals for further promoting SHS. Even support for on-8 
grid solar appears to be lacking as the most recent Least Cost Power Development Plan (LCPDP) 9 
assumes that it is not cost competitive with other generation technologies. The most specific 10 
intentions for PV, concerning rural access goals, relate to the program for rural institutions and the 11 
conversion of a number of large remote diesel installations to diesel-PV hybrid systems (Byrne et al. 12 
2014). More recent developments in energy policy-making in Kenya thus appear to have reversed 13 
even the few indirect policies aimed at supporting the SHS market. Economic considerations and the 14 
need to raise government revenues has led to the abolition of the tax and duty exemptions on PV 15 
products and components and even given rise to new taxes on some components (Byrne et al. 2014). 16 
4.2. Morocco: A utility-led effort to electrify remote villages off the grid 17 
Genesis and evolution of rural electrification plans and policies 18 
Starting with the creation of a special energy fund in 1975, rural electrification in Morocco was 19 
carried out through the National Rural Electrification Program (Programme National d’Electrification 20 
Rurale: PNER). The first two phases of the PNER from 1982–1986 and 1991–2000, show very slow 21 
progress (Karekezi & Kithyoma 2002). A national survey from 1992 suggests that access to electricity 22 
among rural households was 15.6% (Ministère de la Santé Publique & Macro International 1993). The 23 
low financial capacity of the regional autonomous bodies, who were supposed to finance the 24 
program, was considered a shortcoming (Nygaard & Dafrallah 2015).  25 
To overcome this situation and accelerate rural electrification, in July 1995 the Global Rural 26 
Electrification Program (Programme d’Electrification Rurale Globale: PERG) was established. At the 27 
time when the PERG was launched in 1996, official sources indicated that Morocco’s rural 28 
electrification rate was 18% and that the country aimed to bring the rate of rural electrification to 29 
80% by 2010. Since objectives were exceeded in the early years of activity, they were revised to 30 
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electrify all the rural areas by the year 2007. The pace of electrification was also accelerated to target 1 
1,500 to 2,000 villages per year with an estimated annual budget of 150 million dollars.  2 
The PERG is widely considered an example of a successful rural electrification program, though many 3 
authors studying the case have had to rely on the National Office of Water and Electricity’s (Office 4 
Nationale de L’Electricité et de l’Eau potable, ONEE’s)2 own evaluations and data on performance and 5 
impacts (Nygaard & Dafrallah 2015). Nevertheless, the program is responsible for increasing the rural 6 
electrification rate from 18% in 1996 to over 90% by 2013. Building an extensive national village 7 
database for efficient prioritization of actions, detailed grid planning, and clear contractual 8 
arrangements with local governments are all cited as being factors responsible for the success of this 9 
program. A participative financing scheme in which those who benefited contributed 25% of the cost 10 
of electrification, local governments contributed 20%, and ONEE picked up the remaining 55% of the 11 
cost (part of which was financed from a 2.25% solidarity tax on electricity sales) was also considered 12 
an important aspect of the program (Karekezi et al. 2005). A significant part (estimated at close to 13 
half) of ONEE’s contribution to the program was mobilized from international lenders (AFD, IDB, JBIC, 14 
EIB, FADES, Kuwait Fund, KfW) as concessional loans guaranteed by the Moroccan government 15 
(Massé 2010). 16 
Evolution and drivers of residential SHS in rural electrification plans and policies 17 
During the early years of the PERG, the national village database assessment suggested that about 8 18 
to 10% of rural villages were too remote and, therefore, it was too expensive to electrify them 19 
through an extension of the grid. Thus, it was foreseen that these villages would be served by 20 
decentralized PV solar home systems. In 1998, the first major PV SHS initiative, funded by the GEF 21 
and IFC, was initiated (Mostert 2008). Concerns regarding the coverage and speed of SHS 22 
dissemination, as well as adequate repairs and maintenance of the systems, led ONEE to decide to 23 
outsource the off-grid component of its rural electrification program to private contractors. Through 24 
an international bidding process, enterprises were selected for ten-year concessions and contracted 25 
to supply and maintain a fixed number of PV systems in certain specified remote regions (Christensen 26 
et al. 2015). The systems were supplied on a fee-for-service basis with households having to 27 
contribute about 10% of the cost as a connection fee and a regular monthly maintenance fee. The 28 
fee amount was determined by the type of service (size of the system) and was to be paid for over a 29 
period of 10 years (Allali 2011; Nygaard & Dafrallah 2015). After awarding the first concession in 30 
2002, four other concessionaires were included in successive bidding rounds. In total, contracts were 31 
signed to distribute 105,000 SHS installations of an initial estimated 150,000 SHS envisaged when 32 
PERG was launched in 1997. International donor funding was also very instrumental in supporting 33 
the SHS deployment that became part of the PERG to provide access in remote areas (Nygaard & 34 
Dafrallah 2015). 35 
The primary motivation of the Moroccan government in including off-grid SHS as part of its rural 36 
electrification strategy was economic (Amegroud 2015). SHS dissemination was limited to very 37 
remote rural regions where extension of the grid was considered too expensive. However, 38 
subsequently, realizing the climate benefits of the SHS, the program was proposed for funding under 39 
the Clean Development Mechanism and was registered as one of the first programmatic CDM 40 
                                                          
2 ONEE (formerly: Office national de l’électricité, ONE) is a vertically integrated, state-owned utility and the only 
buyer of electricity in Morocco. Moreover, it also supplies 41% of all electricity from its own plants and is thus 
said to dominate the power sector in Morocco (IEA 2014). 
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projects (Nygaard & Dafrallah 2015). For most of the rural population, however, electricity access has 1 
been achieved through connection to the grid (see Table 2). 2 
Targets and achievements: SHS and rural household electrification 3 
Data on outcomes, achievements, and impacts of the rural electrification program (PEERG) and its 4 
SHS component are exclusively available from official ONEE reports. Nygaard & Dafrallah (2015) 5 
suggest that the estimates of the rate of rural electrification are likely to be based on coverage rather 6 
than on an estimate of actual household connections. Even so, they suggest that rural household 7 
access in 2013 is likely to be in the order of 89% (compared to the 98% suggested by ONEE’s 8 
estimates of coverage).  9 













1993 n.a. n.a. 18% 15.6% 
1998 286,899 1885 32% n.a. 
2003 979,489 10,457 62% 51.3% 
2008 1,815,047 51,509 95.4% n.a. 
2013 2,027,120 51,559 98.5% ~89%3) 
Sources: 1) Reproduced from Nygaard & Dafrallah (2015) based on official ONEE’s statistics; 2) Ministère de la Santé 11 
Publique & Macro International (1993); 3) Ministère de la Santè et al. (2003). 4) Best estimate from Nygaard & Dafrallah 12 
(2015). 13 
Independent evaluations of the SHS component of PERG are also missing. It remains unclear why 14 
only half of the 105,000 SHS installations targeted through the concessions have been implemented, 15 
especially considering that this represents an even smaller fraction of the 150,000 originally 16 
estimated as being required. Nygaard & Dafrallah (2015) speculate that consumers might have 17 
considered the SHS a second-best option, providing poorer service at too high a cost. This appears to 18 
be borne out by the fact that as of 2010, ONEE has embarked on a program to connect households to 19 
the grid in areas already provided with SHS (Christensen et al. 2015) and ceased the deployment of 20 
SHS in 2009. Unfortunately, no information or evaluations exist regarding the quality and 21 
performance of the SHS installed.  22 
Changes to plans and policies and future outlook 23 
The Moroccan government has set ambitious targets to diversify its electricity mix and reduce 24 
dependence on imports. In its 2009 National Energy Strategy, renewable energy targets were set to 25 
achieve two GW each for solar, wind, and hydropower respectively by 2020 (42% of the total 26 
electricity capacity in 2020). However, these targets have been set for the construction of medium- 27 
to large-scale power plants; decentralized energy supply is not considered a core element in the 28 
Moroccan Solar Plan or the Moroccan Integrated Wind Energy Programme (Vidican 2015). The key 29 
incentive for this emphasis on large-scale renewables appears to be a desire to increase energy 30 
independence. However, it also aims to attract investments, build technical expertise, and improve 31 
-16- 
 
industrial competitiveness (Steinbacher 2015; Vidican 2015; Marquardt et al. 2015). After years of 1 
debate and increasing pressure from Moroccan companies, the government adopted a PV roadmap 2 
at the end of 2014. In December 2015, a law (Loi 58-15) was eventually passed that will open the 3 
low-voltage grid level and thereby enable the connection of smaller scale RE installations. This is also 4 
expected to make a significant contribution to other socio-economic objectives such as job creation. 5 
5. Discussion 6 
In this section we reflect upon and discuss the implications of the findings of each case study for the 7 
GE conceptual framework. In Kenya and Morocco, renewable energy policies targeted the expansion 8 
of energy access arising from a failure to provide infrastructure. Both cases emphasize that 9 
governments have an important role in the implementation of a GE. In the Kenyan case, where the 10 
development of SHS was more market driven, existing assessments suggest that indirect government 11 
policies and donor finance had an important role to play. This case particularly highlights the need to 12 
put in place an effective regulatory framework with long-term targets. Without such a framework, 13 
deployment could subside over time or certainly not keep pace with targets or requirements. Related 14 
to this is the necessity to build up capacity both for policy-making and monitoring. The availability 15 
and reliability of policy reports and data for Kenya was relatively scarce. This, of course, makes 16 
assessing policies, including the socio-economic effects, very challenging, and highlights the need to 17 
strengthen national monitoring and evaluation capacities.   18 
The case of Morocco is interesting in comparison because a relatively strong policy framework, with 19 
especially clear long-term targets, was put in place and the rural electrification program has been 20 
widely considered a success. Importantly, renewable deployment was largely inspired by economic, 21 
rather than environmental (green), considerations. The aim was to provide access to very remote 22 
villages that were considered too expensive to connect to the grid. Nevertheless, , the fact that SHS 23 
led to an increase in access underlines that renewable deployment can indeed create short-term 24 
socio-economic benefits and thus supports the main assertion of strong green growth (see above). 25 
This is specifically the case when important infrastructure such as grid connections is underprovided 26 
(see Introduction). Recent plans of the utility to connect regions originally covered by the SHS 27 
concessions to the central grid, suggest, however, that these are increasingly being viewed as a 28 
transitional technology. Accordingly, the socio-economic benefits from the initial renewable 29 
deployment are not likely to be sustained in the long run. However, the experience with off-grid solar 30 
may have been one factor prompting plans for more large-scale solar development that are part of 31 
current policies in Morocco. In other words, this might have helped develop “green” technologies 32 
from a niche to a more encompassing, national-level project.  33 
The South African REIPPPP illustrates how socio-economic objectives can be strongly reflected in the 34 
design of policies for the deployment of renewables. Job creation is a particularly pressing problem in 35 
South Africa, which makes it a prototypical case for GE. Political expectations for job creation through 36 
the REIPPPP were very high and even though first reports point to a fulfillment or even over-37 
fulfillment of the creation of jobs promised by the developer, there is great uncertainty surrounding 38 
actual effects as estimated in official figures. Negative policy feedback, due to high expectations, 39 
unclear estimates of impacts, and a lack of available data and independent evaluation, are particular 40 
challenges for the assessment of South African GE concepts. These challenges seem to be typical for 41 
multi-objective policies interlinking environmental and socio-economic objectives, but have hardly 42 
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been addressed in the GE literature. New approaches are only beginning to emerge, such as the 1 
framework developed by Sreenivas et al. (2015).  2 
The case of Germany is interesting in comparison because employment objectives also played an 3 
important role in renewable energy policy, but only unofficially. Job creation was not reflected in 4 
policy design and no local content provisions were included. Nevertheless, expectations were high, 5 
particularly regarding the creation of technology leadership and respective jobs in the solar PV 6 
industry. Deployment of renewables was conceived, at least implicitly, as a green industrial policy. 7 
Accordingly, the German experience constitutes a test case for the strong green growth assertion, 8 
which upholds that the creation of competitive advantages in green technologies is one way to 9 
create both short- and long-term economic benefits, such as jobs. However, while the solar module 10 
and cell manufacturing industry indeed rose to global market leadership from 2009, it experienced a 11 
considerable fall only two years later, with a corresponding decline in the number of jobs. This was 12 
the result of a global industry shake-out following increased competition in combination with little 13 
pre-existing comparative advantages; in fact, this was predicted as a possible outcome by earlier 14 
theoretical literature on job market effects. Accordingly, the case of the German solar industry 15 
questions this aspect of the possibility of (strong) green growth. This must be put somewhat into 16 
perspective, though, because in comparison the wind industry has fared considerably better. 17 
Moreover, it is also possible that a dedicated multiple-objective design might have prevented this 18 
outcome. 19 
6. Conclusion 20 
This multiple-case study produced several findings suggesting that the GE conceptual framework 21 
needs to be reconsidered. First, in support of earlier findings we can confirm that the role of 22 
governments in implementing a long-term GE regulatory framework is of utmost importance. This 23 
may be particularly challenging in countries like Kenya, where capacity for policy making, monitoring 24 
and evaluation of complex policy frameworks needs to be strengthened. Accordingly, capacity 25 
building is an important enabling condition to leverage the potential for GE policies and GG and 26 
should to be addressed head on. 27 
Second, some cases suggest that renewable deployment can generate short-term socio-economic 28 
benefits, which supports the assertion of strong green growth. They also suggest, however, that 29 
these benefits may not be sustained; energy access through SHS may eventually be superseded by 30 
grid access as in Morocco, and jobs created might be lost with the rise of international competition 31 
as in Germany. Whether the benefits could – or should – become more permanent through different 32 
policy designs remains an open question. It also needs to be acknowledged, however, that the 33 
expectation of socio-economic benefits seems to have created political momentum to implement the 34 
respective “green” policies in the first place. In Germany, green policies persist despite ambiguous 35 
job creation results in some segments, while experience with SHS in Morocco has facilitated national 36 
RE policy developments.  37 
Finally, and probably most importantly and novel, this work suggests that designing – and analyzing – 38 
policies aiming to achieve multiple objectives differs considerably from the traditional ideal-type 39 
view of policies as being targeted at single objectives. This is particularly relevant for the GE, as – at 40 
least in our understanding – it ultimately entails a “paradigmatic shift” towards such multi-objective 41 
settings. More precisely, as this paper has underlined, there is a direct interplay between renewable 42 
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deployment and socio-economic objectives that works in two directions (Figure 4); renewable 1 
deployment policies have impacts on socio-economic objectives, but these objectives also influence 2 
the design and evaluation of these policies, which in turn also influences impacts throughout the 3 
policy cycle. 4 
 5 
Figure 4: Inter-linkage between renewable deployment policies and socio-economic objectives 6 
This second aspect has received little attention so far. We agree with Sreenivas et al. (2015) that 7 
there has been much rhetoric while the development of practical methodologies has lagged behind. 8 
Adding to the approach they propose, our findings suggest some additional elements that could be 9 
important, namely the explicit identification of objectives, clear communication and management of 10 
expectations, and a broad and transparent set of indicators for monitoring and evaluation. The 11 
availability of sound and comprehensive data is crucial not only for further GE research, but also to 12 
ensure regulatory stability and sustainable policies. Tremendous opportunities for further research 13 
exist in order to advance our understanding of the extent to which the GE can actually achieve its 14 
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